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GETTING FROM ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO POLICY ADVICE
James T. Bonnen and David B. Schweikhardt
1
When conducting analysis with the intent of advising policy makers, public or private, the
economist faces the challenge of adapting the analysis to the context in which decisions will be made. 
Analysts must convince decision makers, who typically are not economists, that the analysis deals
realistically with actual dimensions of their problem.  Organized groups, who put the problem on the policy
agenda and who are pressing for action, often must be convinced also.  With some problems this may be
easy, but generally it is a substantial challenge.
All I Needed to Know I Learned in Econ. 101
Some of the difficulty lies in our training as economists.  The analytic power of economic analysis
comes from its logical, often mathematical and statistical, rigor and from theory and assumptions that
simplify the conceptual framework of the analysis.  We are trained to resist movement away from this
methodological dispensation.  Many economists, especially those without much experience in policy wars,
fail sufficiently to appreciate the large differences between what a rigorous “economic model” can address
and the actual dimensions of a policy maker’s problem.  Policy problems are often messy and subject to
such large economic and other uncertainties for which a clear or rigorous definition is not easy, to say
nothing of analysis at the economic profession’s expected level of rigor.  In the nature of things there is a
trade-off between rigor and relevance in policy that is unforgiving and unavoidable.  But as Nobel Laureate
T.W. Schultz observed many years ago:
There is no paved highway connecting “economic analysis” and “public policy.”  For the
most part it is an unmapped, badly maintained, and hazardous stretch to travel...  In the
belief, however, that the findings growing out of economic inquiry may be better
understood and thus made more useful in the field of public affairs, economists must, at
least, keep on trying to interpret the results of their studies into the language and in terms
of the values and underlying policy considerations (p. 186).2
This involves risks that must be assumed, if one is to be effective in policy advice and analysis. There is a
growing and thoughtful literature in economics on the problems of providing policy advice that should be
more widely read and taught than it is (e.g., Cairncross, Hansen, Nelson, Schultze, Stein).
One faces a diverse set of unavoidable difficulties in moving from economic analysis to policy
analysis.  Sometimes the analyst is served a “fat pitch” when the policy problem is almost purely economic
and one has the time and resources to do a good piece of work.  Usually, however, policy problems require
knowledge from multiple disciplines so the analysis must at some point involve noneconomic variables. 
This is why even the President’s Council of Economic Advisors has a staff most of whom work in the
applied fields in economics, e.g., labor, agriculture, natural resources, health, education, welfare, industrial
organization, trade, etc.  Perhaps the initial and most disconcerting discovery to the neophyte policy analyst
is that what you were trained to treat as a complex economic problem is, in the policy maker’s view,
usually a political problem with perhaps a few bothersome economic implications.  In any policy decision,
something is being optimized, but from an economic point of view the result is often a 14th best solution. 
Even from the individual views of the major political players, it will often be a third or fourth best outcome
since, given the usual constraints and multiple goals, the outcome will involve political compromise
between conflicting goals.
This is well described by Charles Schultze, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
(CEA) and later also Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB):
Forty years of observing policy debates, including 15 years of participating in them, have
not dulled my amazement at how few participants have a grasp of fundamental economic
principles and how differently from economists they analyze issues.  Several reasons stand
out for the wide divergence between the views of economists and others.  First, to
politicians the world is full of corner solutions; the idea of continuous cost and demand
curves with nonzero elasticities is foreign to their way of thinking.  Second, some
important principles in macroeconomics and international trade are counterintuitive; for
example, the essential reason for a country to export is to import, not to increase total
employment.  In periods of full employment, additional spending on “good things” like
exports or investment can harm the economy.  The balance between a country’s saving and
domestic investment is by far the most important determinant of the trade deficit, not3
“unfair” trading practices by foreign competitors.  Depending on costs, there is almost
always an optimal amount of “bads” that society shouldn’t try to eliminate.  Precious few
policy makers grasp the principle of comparative advantage.
Third, noneconomists have an almost universal desire to deal with market failures through
carefully specified regulation rather than a change in incentive structures.  Such
specification is the natural function of lawyers, and the legal profession continues to
dominate Congress.  When government intervenes in the marketplace, our political leaders
typically rule out the manipulation of economic incentives to deter undesirable actions
because reliance on market responses injects an uncertain, partially random, and therefore
“unfair” set of forces into the picture.  Yet in the American political context, any use of
market forces and incentives for policy purposes would be modest compared to the
enormous power that our society readily cedes to the market over a huge slice of our
national life (p. 27).
It is equally disconcerting to discover that the most useful economic theory in this situation is
found in an introductory economics textbook (Stein, 1995, pp.73-83).  This may lead one to regrets about
the trauma of graduate training until you remember that it was only about the time of your Ph.D. orals or
even later as a teaching assistant introducing sophomores to the mysteries of economics that you really
began to understand with any sophistication the concepts in Economics 101.  Schultze has also described
this situation clearly:
Because microeconomic understanding among many of the players in the policy game is
often so low, the injection of basic microeconomic principles, well back from the frontiers
of research, can significantly raise the quality of the debate.  ...for most issues it is more of
a challenge to CEA members and staff to translate basic economics into language the other
participants in the policy game can understand than to deploy in the debate the latest
refinements of theory and econometrics (p. 28).
The young analyst also needs to be sensitive to common violations of the assumptions of
conventional competitive market theory (Economics 101 can betray one).  These modifications are usually
taught in graduate theory courses today, but only rarely in the context of applied policy analysis.  Thus, as
abstract qualifications their practical significance is often missed even though any well trained economist
knows that the neo-classical model is an over-simplification.  The applied policy economist of any stripe
works in a world of human behavior that is constrained and motivated by institutions: laws, rules,
organizations, traditions and conventions, many of which do not conform to the assumptions of standard4
micro theory.  This is of growing significance in commercial agriculture, which is fragmenting today under
the impact of a maturing industrialization into diverse market structures where many commodities are
proliferating into multiple products of highly diverse characteristics, while associated institutions are
differentiating.
Another former Chairman of the CEA, Herbert Stein, has described the needed skills of a policy
analyst and advisor:
The qualifications for an adviser differ from those for an innovative scientist or theorist. 
People who invent new ideas almost invariably have a devotion to them, but an adviser
should not be so devoted to some new idea that he is unable to give the president a picture
of the options that economics supports....  In addition to a stock of economic knowledge,
which is “slowly replenished and refreshed with a flow of ideas from the journal mill,” a
successful adviser needs “knowledge of the institutions in the field of his concern; a body
of relevant statistical information; a set of ideas about how the government works; a
political calculus of several kinds; judgment; and communication skills.”  These qualities
have been sought by the people selecting members of the CEA and generally found in those
who have accepted the position (Stein, 1995, p. 78).
What I Needed to Know That I Did Not Learn in Econ. 101
Ruttan points out that the primary purpose of economic and other social science knowledge
(research) is the understanding and improvement of institutions.  In economics the theoretical base of the
neo-classical model is being examined and significantly modified today to recognize differences in
institutions, market and product characteristics, and the level and distribution of information available to
decision makers.  This is seen in the evolving development of the new institutional economics, industrial
organization theory and the intersection of the literature on risk, incomplete market (failure) theory, public
choice (government failure) theory, as well as transaction cost theory and the work on the economics of
information.  These developments are beginning to provide a basis for more realistic analysis of policy
problems with substantial economic dimensions.  Some examples can be seen in the accompanying side
bars, which contrast the traditional neo-classical assumptions of perfect competition with some actual
market conditions that can affect policy decisions and identify some of the implications for policy.5
The first side bar arrays the consequences of the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets
(perfect mobility of factors, perfect knowledge and perfect rationality) against the conditions often found in
real markets and some consequences that follow from those conditions.  The second side bar explores the
same contrast in competitive assumptions, real market conditions and consequences, but in this case for the
characteristics of the goods and services produced in markets.  The third side bar provides the same
contrast but for market structure assumptions.  These side bars provide examples of a few of the most
common economic complexities that a well informed policy analyst should be sensitive to in a complex
market economy.
But They Never Told Me About Politics in Econ. 101!
As if that were not enough, there are other challenges unrelated to economics that are inherent in
the policy process.  One is the difficulty of having sufficient information about what the real game is in
which you are advising.  Some decision makers are candid with their analysts about the games they are
playing, so there is little need to expend energy exploring the question.  But if the analyst’s boss is not well
plugged into the political process or is prone to playing complex political games and leaving subordinates
to guess what is really at stake, the successful analyst must spend time discovering “what that game is.” 
Lyndon Johnson, for example, frequently used White House and Executive Office advisors as pawns in his
political games, feeding some of them and their misdirected analysis and advice to the other players with
whom he was negotiating.  In this way he hid some matters or exaggerated the conflict over the decision
and extracted more from the other players in the final compromise.  This ultimately demeans and erodes an
analyst’s credibility with other actors, some of whom one may depend on for information in doing good
policy analysis.  Analysts can get used up fast and cease to be of value in their role in such an environment,
if they do not protect the integrity of their performance.  The quality and integrity of expertise is the only
reason the analyst is allowed “in the game.”  An analyst without a reputation for integrity has nothing to
offer that a player would value.6
Closely related is the problem of an inadequate data base when your boss, under pressure, insists
on concrete numbers to combat someone else’s “bad idea.”  This command will often come in the late
afternoon with your response due in time for a 5:00 p.m. emergency meeting that your boss has with his
superior.  You find no such numbers exist nor is there any basis for an accurate estimate.  Your boss insists
on your best estimate!  The advice you get from the “old pro’s” you know says: 
“Give them what they want.  Your estimate (guess?) is better than any of the policy types
in that meeting.  Besides, when they want it bad, they get it bad.”  
The only problem is that in the following weeks and months, if the issue involved was important, that
number is likely circulating at the highest levels and is now cited as a hard, irrefutable fact.  In subsequent
policy battles you must, if necessary, be able to cite its authority or question its accuracy without blushing. 
This also demonstrates the chronic challenge any analyst faces in a politically active policy environment. 
There is rarely enough time to do complete professional quality research or analysis before producing the
required options paper.  Policy decisions are all too frequently made under great time constraints and in a
cockpit whose parameters of battle are filled with uncertainties.  Indeed, the uncertainty associated with
other variables is often so substantial that reducing your analytic error to a statistically correct 2 percent or
so is wasted effort—even if you have the time.
As a consequence, one should never expect the process of decision to be orderly, follow the formal
organization for decision making, or be controlled by any one or two actors.  The intended results of most
policy decisions are usually swamped by the unintended consequences.  Uncertainty and lack of knowledge
dominate both the decision and implementation processes.  In the 1980s, costs of the Payment In Kind
(PIK) farm program astonished the President’s Office of Management and Budget.  They had suggested the
PIK idea believing it would reduce budget exposure!  The policy process is so messy that the common
notion that outcomes arise from collusion and plots of the powerful (a popular addiction and a media
fixation) is almost certain to be wrong.  Policy actors may try to control an outcome—but rarely, if ever,7
do they succeed.  Separation of powers in U.S. governance institutions prevent it, if countervailing power
and random events do not.  Rather, policy outcomes are all too often dominated by various mixtures of
greed, incompetence, lust for power, stupidity and ignorance—the five horsemen, not of an apocalypse, but
of the policy arena.
Another shock that many young analysts experience is inherent in policy.  That is its value-laden
subjectivity, which, if encountered in the form of highly ideological participants, can be immune to any
appeal to well established facts or the best economic analysis.  While the economist does (or should) know
that logically all decisions are normative and contain some value judgments, policy in the U.S. has become
increasingly driven by ideology in recent times.  While policy conflicts have become more ideological,
successful policy achievement continues to be characterized by pragmatic compromise.  Without
pragmatism and compromise conflict continues and even escalates.  It is sobering to think that even in the
case of success economists as a profession are still likely to be held responsible for economic policy
decision errors by those who believe with John Maynard Keynes that:
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from intellectual influences, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back (p. 383).
In terms of logic, policy decisions are prescriptive (ought or should) statements about the “right” or
“wrong” thing to do. Prescriptions combine relatively factual (or value-free, positive) knowledge (i.e.,
beliefs about what is “true” or “false”) with knowledge about values (beliefs about the “goodness “or
“badness” of situations, conditions and things).  This prescriptive position will be taken in the context of
the constraints imposed by the existing distribution of power and resulting decision rules, as well as current
organized institutions and customs.  Positions taken by participants in the policy process will differ
depending on  differences in the knowledge content of their prescriptions.  Policy combat occurs over both
beliefs about value knowledge as well as positive knowledge and over the distribution of costs and benefits
that might result from a policy.  (Johnson, p.18-20)  8
In our system of democratic institutions policy combat, like power, comes down to a matter of
persuasion and compromise, using whatever resources you have.  In any attempt to persuade others of the
rightness of your position (analysis?) the analyst must recognize that the paramount activity of politics is
redistribution, not efficiency. Commutative and distributive justice arguments, however fallacious, will
often dominate.  One hears much rhetoric about efficiency, but it is used more often in hypocrisy as an
instrument with which to club opponents, hide true objectives and confuse voters than as a genuine goal of
political decisions.  A cynical economist would say that politics is the art of capturing economic rents for
your allies while extracting rents from your foes.  As a consequence, the economist, who is not tied to an
interest or a lobotomous ideology, is frequently a lonely champion of efficiency in the public use of
resources.
Analysts need to be sensitive to these and similar matters in doing their analysis.  In presenting
their results in an options paper or oral presentation, the wise policy analyst, as Schultze suggests, will
avoid any abstruse economic vocabulary and analytic apparatus, unless some economist in the audience
asks directly for such.  On the other hand, these moments create an opportunity to educate one’s principals. 
Simple explanations of the basic concepts will often be in order.  Using such opportunities and having a
bright, receptive audience, Walter Heller, as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, had President
John F. Kennedy and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon reasonably conversant in the basic concepts
and vocabulary of micro and macroeconomics by the end of about two years of continuous interaction.  By
then the Council was making few concessions in the vocabulary used in  memoranda to these two policy
makers.
Conclusion
Economists can abstract from real world conditions for their purposes, but policy makers have to
deal with the world as they encounter it.  So analysts, if they are to influence policy makers, must
understand the policy environment, and accept their policy maker’s perception of that9
environment—except, of course, when the analyst for sufficient reason consciously challenges those
perceptions.  Such challenges had better have an overpowering reason and you had better be right, since
advice that runs counter to your boss’s viewpoint can  eventually erode your “clout” and access.  The
longest surviving and most effective advisors seldom give advice unless it is asked for.  Policy makers vary
greatly in their capacity for and interest in an economic education.  Some will force analysts to explain their
conclusions, others do not want to be bothered or do not have time for it, another dimension that must be
assessed in serving as a policy analyst and advisor.
These are noneconomic matters that should be taught to aspiring policy analysts, but rarely are. 
Too frequently students are left to discover the most elemental aspects by making mistakes on the job. 
Much learning must inevitably be left to experience in a policy analyst or advisor’s role, but some of the
important common aspects of the policy practicum can be taught.  Just sensitizing students to the important
characteristics of the policy process can accelerate their learning and help them avoid many of the mistakes
younger economists often make when learning on the job to be effective policy analysts and advisors.10
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NOTES
1. Professor Emeritus and Associate Professor respectively of Agricultural Economics, Michigan
State University. The authors are indebted to Allan Schmid, Robert Myers and Lindon Robison for
critical reviews of the side bar tables and to William Knudson for a critical review.
2. There is a potential interaction between market condition 2 and 7, significant levels of uncertainty
plus major differences in risk bearing capability or preferences of individual firms creates a
situation in which (a) economies of scale can be more than offset by the diseconomies of risk, (b)
difference but stable equilibria are possible for individual firms of different design* (scale and unit
cost), and thus, (c) an industry equilibrium well short of monopoly or oligopoly can occur that is
stable, and is composed of a distribution of firms that look quite different from one another.
* In the neoclassical paradigm we assume that firms choose optimal levels of a variable
input.  In empirical fact, firms choose design parameters that describe/establish their
production system.12
Side Bar 1
BASIC NEO-CLASSICAL MARKET ASSUMPTIONS
ASSUMPTIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION
MARKET CONDITIONS AFFECTING POLICY
DECISIONS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
1.  Perfect mobility of factors and products:
          Thus, adjustment is costless.
1.  Some factors can be specialized and long
     lived with few or no alternative uses,
     i.e., some factors are immobile, fixed in
     production for long periods of time.
1.  Adjustment is often lagged and costly to
     owners of immobile (fixed) factors.
2.  Perfect knowledge/certainty:
          Thus, decision errors do not occur,
           information has zero cost,
           but also has zero value.
2.  Uncertainty is ubiquitous, and information
      is frequently asymmetric and costly to
      acquire.
2
2.  Ex post decision errors are frequent,
    information is needed to reduce uncertainty
    and thus information has value.
  Since uncertainty cannot be reduced to zero,
      institutions are necessary to deal with the
      remaining irreducible level of uncertainty.
   With uncertainty, past commitments tend to
       become psychological fixed costs for
       policy makers leading to biased or 
       nonrational policy decisions.
3.  Perfect Rationality:
          The pursuit of material welfare by
           individual actors and that of the whole
           have a pareto optimum equilibrium.
3.  Uncertainty + bounded rationality can lead
      to conflicting multiple optimums.
3.  Opportunism and strategic behavior are
    possible when infrequent decisions involve
      specialized assets (Williamson, Ch 2).
Real market conditions 1 + 2 + 3 imply that:
a) transaction costs exist in making market decisions, and, therefore,
b) existing institutional arrangements are not neutral. They both affect and are affected by the outcome of policy decisions.13
Side Bar 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF GOODS/SERVICES PRODUCED
ASSUMPTIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION MARKET CONDITIONS AFFECTING POLICY
DECISIONS
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
4.  Perfect rivalness or divisibility of goods.
          Thus, consumption by one
           precludes consumption by another
4.  Nonrival/indivisible goods exist, where
the marginal cost of an additional user is
zero.
4.  Differences in preferences lead to conflict
      over who will pay for provision of a 
      nonrival good--i.e., who pays the fixed
      cost and who pays the marginal cost.
      Also, conflict arises over who gets to 
       choose the extent of variety in goods 
       offered within the trade-off between
       variety and cost per unit produced--e.g.,
       monoculture vs bio-diversity.
5.  Perfect appropriability: which creates an
     exclusionary good.
          Thus, producers can appropriate or
          capture full cost-plus of a good from
          the market via property rights protected
          by liability rules, patents, copyrights,
          secrecy, etc.
5.  Non-appropriability/non-exclusionary
goods exist.
5.  Private sector producers cannot capture the
     cost of a good from the market and thus,
     underproduce or do not produce it at all.
Real market conditions 4 + 5 imply that conditions for public subsidies of a good, or direct public provision of a good may exist.
However,
a) this involves no presumption of either market or government failure (i.e., the problem is one of the nature of the good produced).
b) public subsidies/provision of a good, while avoiding free rider problems, creates an unwilling rider problem (Schmid).14
Side Bar 3
MARKET STRUCTURE ASSUMPTIONS
ASSUMPTIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION
MARKET CONDITIONS AFFECTING POLICY
DECISIONS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
6.  Atomistic (perfect) markets with large
      numbers of producers and consumers.
          Thus, individual actors are price takers
          who cannot affect the market by their
          individual actions.
6.  Concentration of sellers/buyers exists in
     some markets.
6.  Prices may be affected by the market power
     of the few buyers or sellers who account for
     most of the market transactions.
7.  No economies of scale.
          Thus, a competitive market
equilibrium
          exists in which the number of
          producers is stable, and private costs
          equal social costs.
7.  Economies of scale exist and persist in
some
      markets. Thus, no equilibrium is achieved
      short of one or a few firms.
2
7.  Low unit cost producers will force high cost
     firms out of the market leading toward
     concentration and oligopoly, if not 
     monopoly in the limiting case.
      Concentration creates infant industry 
      problems, where growth becomes path
      dependent--i.e., once investment is
      committed to one technology, a scale-
      economy, unit-cost advantage prevents the
      shift to any new, improved technology.
8.  Complete markets.
          Thus, private costs equal social costs.
8.  Market structures are incomplete. 8.  Important external effects of production or
     consumption exist. Thus, total social costs
     may exceed total private costs.
Real market conditions 6 + 7 and/or 8 imply that an economic rationale for public regulation may exist.
However, 
a) all market situations involve actors whose interests conflict (i.e., policy is never dictated by market or government characteristics
alone).   
b) regulations, private property rights and public spending and production are complements and substitutes in determining whose
     preferences count (and who bears the costs of the consequences) when interests conflict.